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WOLF v. COLORADO OVERRULED: EXCLUSIONARY
RULE EXTENDED TO STATES
Mapp v. Ohio
367 U.S. 643 (1961)
Upon receiving information that a person sought for questioning
might be in the Mapp home, Cleveland police officers demanded entrance.
Petitioner refused to admit them without a search warrant. The officers
remained and when additional officers arrived, they forcibly entered the
home.' Obscene material was discovered during the illegal, widespread search
of the home. Petitioner was convicted in the common pleas court for
possession of the obscene material. 2 The conviction was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Ohio3 but was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.4
The United States Supreme Court overruled its decision in Wolf v.
Colorador which permitted evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure to be introduced in a state court prosecution for a state crime.
The Court in Wolf had refused to extend to the states the holding of Weeks
v. United States.6 In Weeks, the purpose of the fourth amendment was
interpreted "to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials,
in the exercise of their power and authority under limitations and
restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority. . . .7 On this
basis the Court in Weeks decided that evidence unlawfully obtained by
federal officials in violation of the Constitution could not support a con-
viction. The Court in Wolf viewed the holding in Weeks as not being
derived from the explicit requirements of the fourth amendment.8 Thus,
the use of illegally obtained evidence in a state court was not deemed to be
a denial of due process.
1 A paper represented as a search warrant was briefly shown petitioner after the
officers gained entrance to the home, but this "warrant" was not produced at the
trial, and its absence was not accounted for.
2 Petitioner was convicted under Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.34 which provides in part
that "No person shall knowingly . . . have in his possession or under his control
an obscene, lewd, or lascivious book (or) . . . picture. .... "
3 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960). Prior to the decision in the instant
case, evidence obtained by an unlawful search, if competent and pertinent to the
main issue in a criminal case, was admissable against the accused. State v. Lindway,
131 Ohio St. 166 (1936). A majority of the Ohio Court would declare § 2905.34
unconstitutional as a denial of the rights of free thought and expression guaranteed in
the first amendment. However, since the Ohio Constitution requires a vote of all but
one of the judges to declare a law unconstitutional, the conviction was upheld.
4 367 U.S.643 (1961).
r 338 U.S.25 (1949).
6 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
7 Id. at 392.
8 Wolf, supra note 5, at 28.
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The asymmetry Wolf introduced into the law has now been replaced
by a single standard. The double "plimsoll" line of due process for
illegally obtained physical evidence has been replaced by a single line.
The first line established was the means used to obtain the evidence with
a distinction made between state and federal officers. Acts of federal officers
violative of the fourth amendment would prevent the introduction of the
evidence. These same acts necessarily violate the fourteenth amendment
if committed by state officers. However, the court did not hold to this line.
The second line regarding the use of evidence was established. The use was
not considered in violation of the fourteenth amendment, i.e., falling below
the second plimsoll line, unless the methods of obtaining the evidence were
of a special kind or amounted to a gross violation of individual rights.9
Now only one line remains below which "due process" must fall before
there has been a violation of constitutionally protected rights.10
Mapp raises the old issue of whether the exclusionary rule is only a
rule of evidence promulgated under the Court's supervisory power over
administration of criminal procedures in the lower federal courts or whether
the rule has acquired constitutional stature in the context of the fourth
amendment and can be applied to state proceedings through the due process
clause. In the instant case the Court takes the position that the fourth
amendment's guaranty against unreasonable search and seizure is enforceable
against the states through the fourteenth amendment." It follows that an
individual has the right not to be convicted on the basis of evidence which
has been obtained in violation of fourth amendment guarantees. It was
unnecessary for the Court to reach this decision, however, since the issue
presented by the appeal was whether the Ohio statute 2 was "consistent with
the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the
Fourteenth Amendment."'
Now that Wolf has been overruled, the question is whether the decision
will accomplish its intended purpose-greater protection of the individual
9 Kamisar, supra note 15, at 1121-22; Rochin v. California, 343 U.S. 165 (1952);
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
10 "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp,
supra note 4, at 655.
"1 Mapp, supra note 4, at 655.
12 Supra note 2.
13 Mapp, supra note 4, at 673, dissent by J. Harlan. The provision in Ohio Rev.
Code § 2905.34 is very similar to a California Statute that made it "unlawful for any
person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, (or) book .. .
in any place of business where . . . books . . . are sold or kept for sale." The
court held this Statute invalid in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). Thus in a
logical extension in the holding in Smith, the court could have held the Ohio statute
equally invalid. 'The legislative prohibition of possession of books and papers, if not
held invalid, may discourage law-abiding people from even looking at books and




and his right to privacy. This attempt to increase individual privacy seems
inadequate considering the Court's present attitude towards the states' use
of wire tapping and other electronic devices. 14 If illegally obtained physical
evidence is excluded from state courts, the state officers may be discouraged
from making forceful invasions of premises. However, these same officers
are not discouraged from invading individual privacy by means of electronic
devices because wire tapping is not considered a violation of the fourth
amendment.15 Even the Federal Communications Act of 1934 which pro-
hibits wire tapping has not been interpreted to prohibit state use of wire
tap evidence. 16
Thus, while the exclusionary rule protects the property rights of the
individual, it leaves his more important personal rights relatively unpro-
tected.17 The Court has said that the rule" . . . is calculated to prevent, not
to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effective available way-by removing the incentives
14 Evidence obtained by wire tapping is excluded from federal courts, whether it
was secured by federal or state officials. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937)
and Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957). The basis for exclusion is the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. 605. Wire tapping itself
is not a constitutional violation of the fourth amendment. Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 433 (1927). Since wire tapping is not prohibited by the Constitution, any
prohibition imposed on the States must stem from § 605 of the Communications Act,
which provides that no person shall intercept or disclose a communication without
the permission of the sender. The court, however, has not interpreted § 605 as imposing
any restrictions on the states' use of wire tap evidence. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S.
199 (1952). In the latest decision of the court in this area, a federal injunction was
denied to prevent state officials from using wire tap evidence even though obtained in
violation of § 605. Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 453 (1961).
15 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
16 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
17 Originally the enforcement of rules governing search and seizure was by direct
remedies, such as suits for damages for false imprisonment or trespass. These remedies
afforded the greatest protection to the law-abiding citizen and the least to the person
committing a crime. Today these remedies fail to apply sufficient pressure of police to
comply with rules governing search and seizure-hence the exclusionary rule. This shift
to the exclusionary rule, however, has perhaps had the collateral consequence of shifting
judicial protection further towards the protection of property rights and away from per-
sonal liberty. The greatest pressure is placed on the police to conform to the rules regard-
ing searches, while less pressure is applied to secure conformance to the rules regarding
arrest and detention. In its deterrent effect, the exclusionary rule affects only those aspects
of police illegality likely to result in the acquisition of physical evidence of guilt. Illegal
arrests and other forms of police illegality are not effected by the rule. This focusing of
judicial attention on search and seizure tends to create an impression that other forms of
police illegality which invade personal rights and liberties are of lesser importance. Rios v.
United States, 364, U.S. 253 (1960) and Abel v. United States, 363 U.S. 217 (1960) are
illustrative of this. Barret, Jr., "Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the Fourth
Amendment," The Supreme Court Review, 47 (1960). See Kamisar, "Wolf and Lustig
Ten Years Later; Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts," 43 Minn. L. Rev.
1083, 1145-58 for a more optimistic view of the exclusionary rule.
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to disregard it."' s However, the rule deters only those aspects of police
illegality which are likely to result in the acquisition of physical evidence.
The rule does not deter wire tapping, illegal arrest designed to harass,
physical abuse of a suspect, unnecessary destruction of property, illegal
detention not motivated to secure a confession, and other forms of police
abuse.1'
Every state has a provision in its constitution similar to the fourth
amendment.20  Twenty-six of these states have adopted the exclusionary
rule.21 This adoption of the rule can be interpreted in two ways: the trend
may indicate the states are accepting the proposition that the exclusionary
rule is a necessary element to assure due process and thus justifies the Court
in extending the rule through the fourteenth amendment; or the trend
may indicate there is no need for extending the exclusionary rule since
the states themselves are taking steps to protect individual liberties. Be-
cause of this possible dual interpretation, the trend of acceptance by the
states cannot be afforded the weight the Court would give it in support of
their decision. To justify the imposition of the rule on the remaining states,
the Court must give constitutional stature to the rule since it is untenable to
assert the proposition that the Court possesses a general supervisory power
over the state courts.22 This imposition may amount to the Court supervising
the procedures in state courts, but the Court can justify its position behind
a legal facade of due process and find that the right being protected is "of
the very essence of the scheme of ordered liberty" 23 or that it is one of
"those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base
of all our civil and political institutions." 24 This approach is necessary to
avoid the considerations of federalism that are raised by the intervention
of the Court in the states' administration of criminal justice.
The extension of the exclusionary rule to the states is one in a series of
cases which expands the concept of due process.2 5 If this expansion continues,
the entire Bill of Rights may be applied against the states. This result
is not without support from those on the court who feel that ". . . the
pursuit of justice is not the vain pursuit of a remote abstraction; it is a
18 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
19 Barrett, supra note 17, at 55.
20 Berman and Oberst, "Admissibility of Evidence by an Unconstitutional Search and
Seizure," 55 N.W.L. Rev. 525 (1960).
21 Elkins v. United States, supra note 16, Appendix 224-32.
22 Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 4, at 678, dissent by J. Harlan.
23 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
24 Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
25 E.g., mob domination of a trial in 1923, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86; the
right to counsel in 1932, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45; the effect of perjured
testimony in 1935, Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, and see Alcorta v. Texas, 355
U.S. 28 (1957); coerced confessions in 1936, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278;
double jeopardy in 1937, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, and see Hoag v. New
Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1957), and Ciucd v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1957). Brennan, Jr.,
The Bill of Rights and the States, 23 n. 54.
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continuing direction of our daily conduct. Thus when the generation of
1980 receives from us the Bill of Rights, the document will not have exactly
the same meaning it had when we received it .... "26 The special character
of due process is "its power of adaption, its suppleness, its play."2 7 These
characteristics of the due process clause provide the elements the Court needs
to protect individual liberties against government encroachment. There is
little doubt that where individual liberties are in issue the balance struck
by the Court has turned against the states28
The result in Mapp may be undesirable because of the encroachment
on states' rights in the area of administration of criminal justice. Neverthe-
less, the decision has afforded some additional protection to the right of
privacy. State law enforcement officers may be less inclined to act as they
did in the instant case if they realize a conviction will not result from their
efforts.20 The experience in the federal system for nearly half a century
shows that unreasonable searches and seizures are unnecessary for effective
law enforcement. The efficiency of federal agencies has not been diminished
due to the imposition of the exclusionary rule.30 State law enforcement
agencies should be similarly unaffected. 31
Present society is not threatened by such lawlessness and criminal
activity that any justification can be made for intentional and flagrant
abridgement of constitutionally secured rights. There is, of course, need
for the individual to surrender some of his rights of privacy to permit
efficient operation of law enforcement agencies. It is within this area that
the scope and limitations of the fourth amendment's guaranty will be
continually reevaluated.
26 Warren, C. J., "The Law and the Future," Fortune, 230 (Nov. 1955).
27 Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial Process, 84 (1921).
28 Friedelbaum, "The Warren Court and American Federalism-A Preliminary
Appraisal," 28 ChL L. Rev. 53, 87 (1960).
29 "Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states
which follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures than
do those of states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained." Elkins v. United States,
supra note 16, at 218.
30 ".. . It has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation has thereby been rendered ineffective, or that the administration of criminal
justice in the federal courts has thereby been disrupted." Elkins v. United States, supra
note 18, at 218.
31 "Civil rights violations are all the more regrettable because they are so unneces-
sary. Professional standards in law enforcement provide for fighting crime with
intelligence rather than force. . . . In matters of scientific crime detection, the
services of our FBI Laboratory are available to every constituted law enforcement
officer in the nation. Full use of these and other facilities should make it entirely
unnecessary for any officer to feel the need to use dishonorable methods." J. E. Hoover,
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Sept., 1952, pp. 1-2.
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